Discussion of the security risks posed by climate change has become commonplace, and not for no reason: climate change acts as a “threat multiplier,” raising the risk of conflict by—among other things—threatening agriculture and access to water and making some parts of the world inhospitable to human life. Yet some people have pushed back on this framing of the issues, warning that framing climate change as a security issue invites us to think of people harmed by climate change not as victims, but as enemies. In a recent op-ed called “The Myth of Climate Wars?” Alaa Murabit and Luca Bücken argue that these critics are mistaken. “Rather than resisting the securitization of climate,” they say, “advocates and policymakers should be advancing…‘the climatization of security’” by “using security to increase the salience of climate action, highlighting the shortcomings of current security frameworks, and promoting gender inclusiveness and local leadership as holistic and long-term solutions for fostering local, regional, and international peace.”
There is compelling evidence that the resulting agreements are likely to be more durable and the peace longer-lasting if local women are more involved in conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes. Both for that reason and for the sake of gender equity more generally, Murabit and Bücken are quite right to suggest that we need to give them the tools they need to do that. Nevertheless, trying to temper discussions of the security threat posed by climate change by “climatizing” security talk seems to me a dangerous mistake. Rather than doing that, I submit, we should abandon the security frame entirely at the level of messaging, instead emphasizing conflict prevention and peacebuilding, terms that have the distinct advantage of not suggesting that desperate people whose wells have run dry are our enemies.
The only reason Murabit and Bücken give for retaining the emphasis on security is that “linking climate change to security can positively contribute to mobilizing climate action.” Presumably their thought is that talk of threats to our national security is likely to galvanize people into action by convincing them that climate change is a threat to their personal well-being. Certainly, that’s possible: if you’re worried about some threat, a rational response is to try to nip it in the bud by addressing its root cause. What seems more likely, however, is that many people will respond to discussions of the security threat climate change poses by pushing for hardened borders and more preparations for the climate wars they have been led to think they need to worry about. Consider, for instance, the reaction we have seen in the US to migrants from Northern Triangle countries seeking asylum, some of whom fled after finding that their traditional farming techniques no longer workable in light of increasing drought and changing rainfall patterns. Far from spurring climate action, first Candidate and then President Trump's and others' presentation of these people as threats to national security has spurred calls to “build the wall.” Similarly, refugees fleeing the Syrian Civil War--a conflict precipitated, in part, by record-setting droughts--have been greeted by nativist backlash throughout Europe.
Not only are there no good reasons to retain the security frame, however; framing climate change as a security threat carries serious risks. As Murabit and Bücken themselves note, emphasizing the security threat posed by climate change could “challenge already-strained international cooperation on climate governance, while driving investment away from necessary interventions—such as the shift to a low-carbon economy—toward advancing military preparedness.” Even more worrisome, there is a real chance that framing climate change as a security threat will exacerbate frightening recent trends in European and American politics. After all, the more people harmed by the disruptive effects of climate change are presented as threats to our way of life, the more reasonable it will come to seem to for governments to take extreme measures to protect their citizens. Just recently, for instance, the crowd at a Trump campaign rally cheered when an attendee suggested we shoot incoming migrants; President Trump made a joke about the comment.
Admittedly, Murabit and Bücken are probably right that, given its implications for migration, public health, resource scarcity, and other pressing policy issues, it will be difficult if not impossible to completely disentangle climate and security discussions. Moreover, and for the same reason, it is understandable that people have become concerned about potential security threats associated with climate change. Even so, I think we do well to at least de-emphasize the point if not avoid it entirely, emphasizing instead the need for cooperation and solidarity in the face of scarcity. What evidence we have available to us seems to suggest that emphasizing threats associated with these various phenomena does little to spur climate action; meanwhile, that strategy has the potential to do a good deal of additional harm to those most affected by climate change.
Tuesday, May 28, 2019
Thursday, March 28, 2019
Three Steps Congress Can Take to Prepare for the Era of Mass American Climate Migration
Recently, and quite rightly, the potential for significant near-term increases in climate-induced migration has received a good deal of attention; however, relatively little discussion to date has focused on the potential for climate-induced displacement within the US. This is unfortunate, since some of the same climate impacts that will drive migration elsewhere are present here, including sea-level rise, increasing average temperatures, more frequent, longer, and more intense heatwaves, and wildfires. These climatic changes have the potential to displace millions of Americans: according to one study, sea-level rise alone may affect up to 13.1 million Americans by 2100, leading to “to US population movements of a magnitude similar to the twentieth century Great Migration of southern African-Americans.”[1] Migration on this scale would be extremely disruptive not just for migrants themselves but also for the communities where they take up residence. To minimize these harms, Congress should act now both to minimize the number of people who find themselves compelled to flee their homes and to help those forced to move. In what follows, I explores the various potential drivers of climate-induced displacement in the US and recommend policies to achieve both aims.
Potential Drivers of Climate-Induced Displacement in the US
The factors likeliest to lead Americans to move differ from one region to another.
On the east coast, by far the most potent driver of displacement is sea-level rise. In 2011, Hurricane Sandy demonstrated the extreme vulnerability of parts of New York, and Miami and Charleston are already experiencing considerable, frequent flooding. The latter have already driven some residents away.[2] Although communities across the east and gulf coasts are at risk, Florida appears to be by far the most vulnerable: a recent analysis by Climate Central found that twenty-two of the twenty-five US cities most at risk of coastal flooding are in the Sunshine State.[3]
In the Southwest, higher temperatures will be the primary driver of migration. Across the region, average and average maximum temperatures are expected to increase,[4] and heatwaves are projected to become more frequent, longer, and more intense.[5] For instance, in Phoenix—probably the most at-risk major city in the Southwest—the average temperature in July could approach 110 degrees Fahrenheit by 2100.[6] Heat stress is already the leading cause of weather-related death in the US, and the annual number of deaths is expected to increase as heatwaves worsen.[7] Faced with these scorching temperatures, we can expect that many people will pack their bags and head for cooler climes.
In the Western US as a whole, pressure to migrate will come, not from heat or drought
directly, but from their most destructive consequence: wildfires. According to a report by the US Global Climate Change Research Program, “[m]odels project…up to a 74% increase in burned area in California, with northern California potentially experiencing a doubling under a high emissions scenario toward the end of the century.”[8] Even worse, annual burn areas in western Colorado and northwestern Wyoming could increase by up to 650% with just one degree Celsius of additional warming—at this point, a fairly optimistic scenario (see Figure 1 at right).[9] Fires threaten the safety, not only of those in their direct path but, because of their effects on air quality, of those in surrounding areas as well.
Strategies for Decreasing the Risk of Displacement and Reducing Harms to Migrants
In light of these risks, Congress should take action to minimize the number of people who find themselves compelled to flee their homes and to reduce the harms suffered by those forced to move. Three strategies seem especially promising.
Strategy 1: Congress should create a new safety net program to help people adapt to climate change or move if necessary. As is the case with many environmental problems, sea-level rise, heatwaves, and wildfires will disproportionately affect lower-income people, who are at once less equipped to protect themselves from these threats and less capable of escaping them by migrating than wealthier people. A means-tested, federal safety net program allocating funds to lower income people to help them adapt—by, say, buying an air conditioner—or move away would help to reduce these inequalities. The program could be administered by FEMA, which already has the institutional infrastructure and expertise necessary to help people harmed by natural disasters. To make sure the people who need it most know about the program, Congress could allocate funds for TV advertising, as the Obama administration did to get the word out regarding the Affordable Care Act.
Strategy 2: Congress should mandate that prospective residents be informed of climate-related risks before buying property or building new homes. At present, many states require that sellers disclose flood-related risks, but twenty-one states require no such disclosure, and none require that wildfire- or heat-related risks be disclosed.[10] A program like this would help prospective residents to make informed decisions and to plan appropriately for future contingencies, likely reducing the number of people who move to disaster-prone areas in the first place. As a result, fewer people would be harmed, and the aforementioned safety net program would be cheaper.
Strategy 3: Congress should do what it can to promote of use zoning laws to limit or prohibit development in at-risk areas. Because zoning is typically handled at the local level, Congress’ power is limited here, but there are ways Congress can encourage local governments to enact smart zoning laws. For instance, Congress could make participation in the National Flood Insurance Program contingent on the enactment of strategic zoning laws. Like laws requiring disclosure to prospective residents of climate-related risks, laws like these would help to reduce the number of people living in disaster-prone areas, in turn reducing both the number of people who will be harmed and the cost of a new, climate-related safety net program.
All of these policies are likely to be opposed by homeowners in disaster-prone areas, who may very well see the value of their homes decrease as a result. This should not lead Congress to balk, for in the long run, these policies will help fall more people than they hurt. Still, the potential for resistance from homeowners might make it politically expedient to make the safety net program universal rather than means-tested. In that case, all homeowners would benefit from the program.
Conclusion
Climate change poses a variety of threats to the health and well-being of millions of Americans. Without aggressive mitigation measures in the very near future, many of the potential harms will be unavoidable. Even so, by working now to establish and publicize a new safety net program to help especially vulnerable people, mandating that prospective residents be fully informed of the risks, and taking what steps it can to encourage smart zoning laws, Congress can significantly reduce both the harms people will suffer and the extent to which climate change will upend their lives.
Notes
[1] Hauer et al., “Millions Projected to Be at Risk from Sea-level Rise in the Continental United States,” Nature Climate Change 6, no. 7 (2016): 691-695.
[2] Oliver Milman, “‘We’re Moving to Higher Ground’: America’s Era of Climate Mass Migration is Here,” The Guardian, September 24, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/sep/24/americas-era-of-climate-mass-migration-is-here (accessed 11/20/18).
[3] Kulp et al., “These U.S. Cities Are Most Vulnerable to Major Coastal Flooding and Sea Level Rise,” Climate Central, October 25, 2017, http://www.climatecentral.org/news/us-cities-most-vulnerable-major-coastal-flooding-sea-level-rise-21748 (accessed 11/20/18).
[4] Based on predictions from https://www.climate.gov/maps-data/data-snapshots/averagetemp-decade-LOCA-rcp85-2090-07-00?theme=Projections (access 11/20/18).
[5] Garfin, G., et al, “Ch. 20: Southwest,” in Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National Climate Assessment, ed. J. M. Melillo, Terese (T.C.) Richmond, and G. W. Yohe, U.S. Global Change Research Program (2014), p. 471. Available at https://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/regions/southwest (accessed 11/20/18).
[6] Based on predictions from https://www.climate.gov/maps-data/data-snapshots/averagetemp-decade-LOCA-rcp85-2090-07-00?theme=Projections (access 11/20/18).
[7] Garfin, G., et al, “Ch. 20: Southwest,” p. 471.
[8] Garfin, G., et al, “Ch. 20: Southwest,” p. 468.
[9] National Research Council, Climate Stabilization Targets: Emissions, Concentrations, and Impacts over Decades to Millennia, (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2011), p. 180.
[10] Natural Resources Defense Council, “How States Stack Up on Flood Disclosure,” https://www.nrdc.org/flood-disclosure-map (accessed 11/27/18).
Potential Drivers of Climate-Induced Displacement in the US
The factors likeliest to lead Americans to move differ from one region to another.
On the east coast, by far the most potent driver of displacement is sea-level rise. In 2011, Hurricane Sandy demonstrated the extreme vulnerability of parts of New York, and Miami and Charleston are already experiencing considerable, frequent flooding. The latter have already driven some residents away.[2] Although communities across the east and gulf coasts are at risk, Florida appears to be by far the most vulnerable: a recent analysis by Climate Central found that twenty-two of the twenty-five US cities most at risk of coastal flooding are in the Sunshine State.[3]
In the Southwest, higher temperatures will be the primary driver of migration. Across the region, average and average maximum temperatures are expected to increase,[4] and heatwaves are projected to become more frequent, longer, and more intense.[5] For instance, in Phoenix—probably the most at-risk major city in the Southwest—the average temperature in July could approach 110 degrees Fahrenheit by 2100.[6] Heat stress is already the leading cause of weather-related death in the US, and the annual number of deaths is expected to increase as heatwaves worsen.[7] Faced with these scorching temperatures, we can expect that many people will pack their bags and head for cooler climes.
 |
| Percent Increase in Median Annual Area Burned with a 1ºC Increase in Global Average Temperature. |
Strategies for Decreasing the Risk of Displacement and Reducing Harms to Migrants
In light of these risks, Congress should take action to minimize the number of people who find themselves compelled to flee their homes and to reduce the harms suffered by those forced to move. Three strategies seem especially promising.
Strategy 1: Congress should create a new safety net program to help people adapt to climate change or move if necessary. As is the case with many environmental problems, sea-level rise, heatwaves, and wildfires will disproportionately affect lower-income people, who are at once less equipped to protect themselves from these threats and less capable of escaping them by migrating than wealthier people. A means-tested, federal safety net program allocating funds to lower income people to help them adapt—by, say, buying an air conditioner—or move away would help to reduce these inequalities. The program could be administered by FEMA, which already has the institutional infrastructure and expertise necessary to help people harmed by natural disasters. To make sure the people who need it most know about the program, Congress could allocate funds for TV advertising, as the Obama administration did to get the word out regarding the Affordable Care Act.
Strategy 2: Congress should mandate that prospective residents be informed of climate-related risks before buying property or building new homes. At present, many states require that sellers disclose flood-related risks, but twenty-one states require no such disclosure, and none require that wildfire- or heat-related risks be disclosed.[10] A program like this would help prospective residents to make informed decisions and to plan appropriately for future contingencies, likely reducing the number of people who move to disaster-prone areas in the first place. As a result, fewer people would be harmed, and the aforementioned safety net program would be cheaper.
Strategy 3: Congress should do what it can to promote of use zoning laws to limit or prohibit development in at-risk areas. Because zoning is typically handled at the local level, Congress’ power is limited here, but there are ways Congress can encourage local governments to enact smart zoning laws. For instance, Congress could make participation in the National Flood Insurance Program contingent on the enactment of strategic zoning laws. Like laws requiring disclosure to prospective residents of climate-related risks, laws like these would help to reduce the number of people living in disaster-prone areas, in turn reducing both the number of people who will be harmed and the cost of a new, climate-related safety net program.
All of these policies are likely to be opposed by homeowners in disaster-prone areas, who may very well see the value of their homes decrease as a result. This should not lead Congress to balk, for in the long run, these policies will help fall more people than they hurt. Still, the potential for resistance from homeowners might make it politically expedient to make the safety net program universal rather than means-tested. In that case, all homeowners would benefit from the program.
Conclusion
Climate change poses a variety of threats to the health and well-being of millions of Americans. Without aggressive mitigation measures in the very near future, many of the potential harms will be unavoidable. Even so, by working now to establish and publicize a new safety net program to help especially vulnerable people, mandating that prospective residents be fully informed of the risks, and taking what steps it can to encourage smart zoning laws, Congress can significantly reduce both the harms people will suffer and the extent to which climate change will upend their lives.
Notes
[1] Hauer et al., “Millions Projected to Be at Risk from Sea-level Rise in the Continental United States,” Nature Climate Change 6, no. 7 (2016): 691-695.
[2] Oliver Milman, “‘We’re Moving to Higher Ground’: America’s Era of Climate Mass Migration is Here,” The Guardian, September 24, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/sep/24/americas-era-of-climate-mass-migration-is-here (accessed 11/20/18).
[3] Kulp et al., “These U.S. Cities Are Most Vulnerable to Major Coastal Flooding and Sea Level Rise,” Climate Central, October 25, 2017, http://www.climatecentral.org/news/us-cities-most-vulnerable-major-coastal-flooding-sea-level-rise-21748 (accessed 11/20/18).
[4] Based on predictions from https://www.climate.gov/maps-data/data-snapshots/averagetemp-decade-LOCA-rcp85-2090-07-00?theme=Projections (access 11/20/18).
[5] Garfin, G., et al, “Ch. 20: Southwest,” in Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National Climate Assessment, ed. J. M. Melillo, Terese (T.C.) Richmond, and G. W. Yohe, U.S. Global Change Research Program (2014), p. 471. Available at https://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/regions/southwest (accessed 11/20/18).
[6] Based on predictions from https://www.climate.gov/maps-data/data-snapshots/averagetemp-decade-LOCA-rcp85-2090-07-00?theme=Projections (access 11/20/18).
[7] Garfin, G., et al, “Ch. 20: Southwest,” p. 471.
[8] Garfin, G., et al, “Ch. 20: Southwest,” p. 468.
[9] National Research Council, Climate Stabilization Targets: Emissions, Concentrations, and Impacts over Decades to Millennia, (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2011), p. 180.
[10] Natural Resources Defense Council, “How States Stack Up on Flood Disclosure,” https://www.nrdc.org/flood-disclosure-map (accessed 11/27/18).
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